The problem of perceptual self-location
We perceive things in the external world as spatially located both with respect to each other and to ourselves, such that they are in principle accessible from where we seem to be. I hear the door bang behind me; I feel the pen on the desk over to my right; and I see you walking beneath the line of pictures, from left to right in front of me. By displaying these spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception places us in the perceived world: our world and the world we perceive are one. Clearly this is not achieved by our continually perceiving ourselves along with the things around us, and thus recovering our position with respect to them. Indeed I shall argue that there are serious difficulties with the suggestion that this might be the basic mechanism for perceptual selflocation. Furthermore, I shall argue that our existence as an element of the objective order cannot be inferred from the raw given in sense perception. Hence it cannot even be on the right lines as an answer to the question 'What is it for perception to represent its objects as environmental to the subject?', that it should present these objects, along with the perceiving subject himself, or along with something from which his existence in the perceived world could be deduced, in the very same frame so to speak. Nevertheless it yields him an awareness of himself as there in the wings of that scene, genuinely located with respect to the action, yet somehow not normally quite getting onto the stage. And I shall argue here, that perceptual contents succeed in being self-locating in this way in virtue of their immediate role in the control and coordination of spatial behavior.
What we need, is an account of what it is in virtue of which the perceived world is represented as containing the perceiving subject himself. What is it in virtue of which perceptual contents are thus self-locating? Well perception places the perceiver in the world of its objects by representing their spatial relations with respect to him. So our problem is to give an account of what it is in virtue of which perceptual experience carries such egocentric spatial content. What is it in virtue of which perception represents things as standing in various spatial relations with the perceiver? There are persuasive arguments to suggest that this cannot be the province of perceptual experience alone. These are in effect developments of the arguments which David Pears gives on Wittgenstein's behalf against Russell's two theories of the self (1987, ch. 7, esp. pp. 179-84) , which I consider in detail in a moment. So my contention will be that perception meets the demand on self-location only in virtue of its context of other psychological abilities. In particular, and taking a lead from Schopenhauer, self-locating 1 That there is a real need for a substantive account here, follows from a minimal sympathy with Peacocke's 'Discrimination Principle', that "for each content a thinker may judge, there is an adequately individuating account of what makes it the case that he is judging that content rather than any other" (1988, p. 468) , as applied to nonconceptual, perceptual contents. Here as elsewhere, I adopt the fairly standard use of 'nonconceptual' for contents whose canonical characterization involves concepts which a subject need not possess in order to to have experiences with those contents.
It might be objected that the first-person way of thinking is necessarily a conceptual constituent in any genuinely self-locating content: perceptual self-location requires possession of a concept of oneself. So the search for a constitutive account of nonconceptual, self-locating perceptual content is misguided. Now it is certainly true that full-blown thought and judgement about one's place as one object among many, a person, in the objective world requires possession of a first-person concept. And I see no reason why perceptual contents might not also attain this conceptual sophistication. I am concerned with a more primitive layer of content though, which is the nonconceptual foundation for the perspectival nature of perceptual experience which grounds such thought and judgement. This is the basic notion of egocentric spatial perception, stripped of the conceptual context required to fill out what is placed at the centre of the perceptual field into a Strawsonian person, but nevertheless sufficient to unite the perceiver's world with the world perceived. perceptual experience is intimately bound up with the subject's capacity for (attempted) purposive behavior. Perceptual contents locate the subject in the perceived world in virtue of their role in grounding his capacity for perceptually guided spatial action.
To paraphrase two theses Christopher Janaway attributes to Schopenhauer (1983-4) , (i) qua subject of representation (thought and experience) alone, I can have no sense of myself as an item in the world; but (ii) qua subject of will, I do have a sense of myself as an item in the world.
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Therefore any subject whose perceptual experience displays the egocentric spatiality we are interested in, must be a subject of will.
Perceptual self-location is not purely perceptual
Self-locating spatial perception provides its subject with the impression of herself as in amongst the very objects of her perception, by representing these objects as standing in various spatial relations with her. It puts her in the world she perceives. Such perception unifies the perceiver's space with the space perceived.
It is clear though, that this is not achieved by her continually perceiving a particular object which happens to be her, as standing in these various spatial relations with the other objects of her perception. These are actually weaker variants of his (A) and (B) (p. 148). It is Schopenhauer's extreme idealism which transforms my (i) and (ii), which I argue should be endorsed, into his unacceptable claims. I discuss this matter in section 6, as part of a brief comparison between my views and those Janaway's (1989) Schopenhauer. obvious that even in the rare cases in which I do perceive myself as an object, this suffices for the required self-location. It suffices only if my perception of what is in fact my body makes immediate contact with my conception of myself as the subject of this perception.
And I share the widespread conviction that 'the subject of this perception' cannot be a purely perceptual mode of presentation of anything. Wittgenstein's (1961, § § 5.631-5 .6331) development of Hume's famous claim that "I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception" (1978, p. 252) , as an argument against Russell's (1912) first theory of the self, on which the subject is known to himself by acquaintance. As a matter of fact, one does not normally encounter oneself as an object in experience. Nor could one do so, under the subjective mode of presentation 'the subject of this experience'. For in purely perceptual terms, this mode of presentation is tied to the idea of a focal point behind the perceptual field, as its origin.
I think this conviction is what finds expression in
Something more than mere perceptual experience is required to anchor this point to a determinate item in the perceived world, and thus to locate the subject of perception. So there is nothing which would be purely perceptually identifying an object of perception as the subject of that perception.
To paraphrase Sydney Shoemaker (1984, p. 13 ) on this point, there is no perceiving of oneself which explains one's awareness that one is an element of the perceived world in a way analogous to that in which one's sense perception of John explains one's placement of him in the world. For no perception could provide the primary identification of the located item as oneself, the subject of perception.
3
Schopenhauer puts the same point as follows. Shoemaker's original point here, is that we should construe the Humean unencounterability thesis as a general resistance to the assimilation of self-awareness expressed by uses of 'I' 'as subject' to perceptual demonstrative knowledge.
On the purely objective path, we never attain to the inner nature of things, but if we attempt to find their inner nature from the outside and empirically, this inner always becomes an outer in our hands; the pith of the tree as well as its bark; the heart of the animal as well as its hide; the white and yolk of an egg as well as its shell. (1966, pp. 273-4) Stripping away the 'superficial characteristics', as it were, of any perceptual object, in the attempt to reveal its essence as the perceiving self, is bound to fail. For all it can expose is a further object of perception. Some prior subject-object identification is required for the perceptual recognition of the perceiver as the perceiver. So the kind of self-location we are concerned with cannot be the immediate upshot of anything like self-perception. That is to say, the environmentality of spatial perception cannot consist in the subject's purely perceptual acquaintance with himself as in amongst the objects of perception.
Of course one might still resist the claim that 'the subject of this perception' is not a purely perceptual mode of presentation of an object, in which case the analogy between perceptual self-location and perceptual other-location is still in play as a possibility. But the fact is that this is not normally, if ever, the actual pattern of self-location. I immediately perceive things other than myself as standing in various spatial relations with myself. And this is what I am interested in.
Perceptual self-location is not inferential
An obvious alternative to the idea that perception places its subject in the perceived world in virtue of a direct perceptual encounter with the self as an object, is that one's containment is inferred from something else which is given immediately in experience.
But there are two related difficulties with this suggestion. One stems from Pears' Wittgensteinian argument against Russell's second theory of the self, on which the subject is known to himself by description. The other is a more general worry about how a person's location as a constituent of the world could ever be inferred without circularity from his immediate perception of anything but himself as one object among others, which we have just seen is implausible. I shall take these in turn.
What is required, is that a subject should infer his place in the world on the basis of his experience, of which he is not an object. Thus he must begin with a preliminary identification of himself, the item to be located in the perceived world, simply as the subject of that experience, and hope to proceed from there. But it is difficult to see how any such identification of the self as 'the subject of this experience' could ever be acceptable. For it precludes the perceiver's grasp of the contingent dependence of the course and nature of his experience on the way the world is in itself and his continuous spatio-temporal route through it, unless he already has some notion of himself as an item in the perceived world. And yet the identification is being suggested as a prelude to his inferring some such conception from the content of his experience.
An initial stab at the point might be to object that the proposed self-identification makes necessary something which is clearly contingent: the fact that the subject's experience happens to be the way it is. It is quite contingent that I now see that person walking past my window, or feel this arrangement of objects on the desk in front of me. As Pears puts it (1987, p. 182) , these perceptions "need not have been included in my experiences today". Since perception is the joint upshot of the way the world is in itself on the one hand, and the subject's spatial relations and receptivity with respect to it on the other, any token perception of mine might not have been a perception of mine. This is not because it might have been someone else's or existed unowned, but because the world might have been different or I might have been somewhere else in it or even asleep. But the formula 'I am the subject of this experience' appears to make my self-ascription of this experience a necessary truth, by definitionally cementing me to the actual course of my experience.
The obvious reply here, is that any appearance of necessity is illusory. Given a reference-fixing definite description 'the F', of a material object a, we have no problem in understanding the possibility that a might not have been the F. Similarly here, why do I suppose there to be any difficulty in a person's grasping the possibility that she might not have been the subject of such and such perceptual experience, given her reference-fixing self-identification as the subject of that experience? Well we should reflect on what grounds our access to the thought that a might not have been the F. And it seems to me that this has to do with our having some basic conception of such objects as spatiotemporal particulars. This provides a neutral domain of individuals over which the description ranges and with respect to which the contingency can be understood. Given a domain of such particulars and a predicate 'x is F', and given that a is actually the unique satisfier of the predicate in the domain, we can understand the possibility that a might not have been the F in terms of the fact that there are possible worlds in which it is not true of that spatio-temporal individual that it is uniquely F. This possibility is made intelligible by our having a more basic grasp on the kind of thing that a is than is provided merely by the reference-fixing definite description 'the F'.
To insist that such a basic conception is equally available in the current case of a person's descriptive self-identification as the subject of such and such perceptual experience -for persons are spatio-temporal particulars too -is to misunderstand the project of inferred perceptual self-location. What is required, is not a recipe enabling the theorist both to infer the subject's location as an element of the perceived world on the basis of her (that is the subject's) perception and at the same time to appreciate the contingency of her actually having that particular experience. It is rather an explanation of what it is for perception to provide the subject herself with this simultaneous understanding of self-location and contingency. The whole point of a person's purported self-identification as the subject of this particular course of experience, is to place herself as an individual in the perceived world. So she cannot assume a prior, objective selfidentification in giving sense to the suggestion that she might not have been the subject of that experience.
If the inferential account of perceptual self-location is to get off the ground, the subject's preliminary identification of herself must allow for some appreciation of the contingency of the actual course of her experience. For this is an essential aspect of her perception as of a spatial world, of which she is a located constituent. In the absence of her prior placement of herself as an individual in the perceived world though, the current suggestion, 'the subject of this experience', simply fails to do this.
One might object at this point, that I am being unfair to the proponent of inferred selflocation. For there must clearly be more to the account than the bare formula 'I am the subject of this experience'. And what is to stop its being supplemented with the further thought 'I am at the location displayed by this experience', which would give the subject a hold on himself as a spatial entity and hence allow for his appreciation of the contingency of his particular experiential route through the world? Well this brings me on to my second, general difficulty with the inferential approach. Perhaps it is right that the subject's self-identification and his placement of himself as an element of the perceived world come together, so to speak, neither available in advance of the other. But there is still a substantial problem with the current proposal about the role of the formula 'I am the subject of this experience located at the place displayed by this experience' in perceptual self-location.
The idea that perception represents objects as standing in spatial relations with its subject in virtue of his appeal to something like this formula is surely circular. For what feature of the phenomenology of perceptual experience itself could justify the inference to the idea that as its subject I must therefore be a part of the spatial world? Even given an unproblematic self-identification of the subject of experience, how can this help with his placement in the perceived world? Well, self-locating, egocentric perception of the kind we are interested in represents things as spatially related with respect to the perceiver. Its contents are determinately as of his spatial environment. Here there is no need for any inference. But in enquiring into what it is about perceptual experience in virtue of which it carries such contents, it is a step in the wrong direction simply to avert to its being as of things around the subject. How can such experience -experience of objects, their relations and properties -in which the subject himself never appears qua subject, manage to place him in the world of those objects? Of course its doing so is precisely its being as of things at places spatially related to his own, and thus in principle accessible to him. Our question is how such experience is possible though. We get nowhere in answering it if we simply assert that perception succeeds in being self-locating precisely by being self-locating. The problem is to understand the way in which perceptual experience displays a location for its subject with respect to its objects at all; and the current purported solution simply takes this for granted.
Thus it seems that the crude attempt to explain what it is in virtue of which perception represents various spatial relations as obtaining between its objects and the perceiving subject himself on the basis of a simple inference from the nature of perceptual experience alone, is bound to fail. A constitutive account of the egocentric spatiality of such experience will require its setting in a wider context of psychological states and abilities which contribute to the perceptual placement of the subject in the perceived world.
The subject's Simple Theory of Perception
A dominant theme in my various arguments against the inferential account of perceptual self-location is the idea that these formulae for identifying the self as 'the subject of this experience' and its location as 'the location displayed in this experience' cement the self and its location too firmly to the course of experience itself. Thus the subject is left with no sensitivity to his being an individual whose experience might have been different, and whose actual experience is partially explained by his contingent and changing location in the perceived world. His grasp of the systematic dependence of his perception on his spatial relations with the constituents of the perceived world is undermined. But some sensitivity to this dependence is at the heart of what is involved in ascribing perceptual contents representing genuinely spatial relations between the perceiver and the things in his environment. Therefore there must be a kind of awareness of himself as a spatial entity which transcends anything available merely as a simple construct out of experience.
Thinking along these lines motivates a rather more sophisticated suggestion, that selflocating spatial perception must feed as input into what has been called a 'Simple Theory of Perception' (Strawson 1966, 2.II; Evans 1982, ch. 7; Campbell 1984-5; Cassam 1989; and Peacocke 1992, sect. 4) . This is a holistically evolving pattern of judgements and inferences, simultaneously solving for the identity of what is perceived and the subject's location in the world, on the basis of his experience. And the idea is that it is precisely in virtue of its serving as input into such a background theory that perceptual experience displays the 'double aspect' definitive of its both building up a picture of an independent spatial world and constituting its subject's particular experiential route through that world.
Evans characterizes the kinds of reasoning exploited by this theory as follows.
'I perceive such-and-such, such-and-such holds at p, so (probably) I am at p'; 'I perceive such-and-such, I am at p, so such-and-such holds at p'; 'I am at p, such-andsuch does not hold at p, so I can't really be perceiving such-and-such, even though it appears that I am', 'I was at p a moment ago, so I can only have got as far as p', so I should expect to perceive such-and-such '. (1982, p. 223) The thought is that a subject's use of her perceptual experience in accordance with these simple theoretical principles is precisely her grasp of it as the joint upshot of the way the world independently is and her location in it, which is at the same time its placing her as an object in the perceived spatial world. Thus according to the present view, the essential psychological context for self-locating, environmental spatial perception is its contribution to a Simple Theory of Perception, which simultaneously solves both for what is being perceived and for where the subject is. Now it might be objected that even this far more sophisticated account is still vulnerable to the difficulties I have been considering with respect to descriptive selfidentification. For it is a hidden premise in each of the little arguments constituting the Simple Theory of Perception, that the self being located is identical to the subject of the experience enabling her location. This can be brought out by analogy with Shoemaker's qmemories. These are past-directed epistemic states of the same general kind as memories, but which are "subject to a weaker previous awareness condition …. Whereas someone's claim to remember a past event implies that he himself was aware of the event at the time of its occurrence, the claim to quasi-remember [q-remember] a past event implies only that someone or other was aware of it" (1984a, p. 24). In other words, although I may only remember my own past, the suggestion is that I might q-remember your past, in the same way: 'from the inside'.
Similarly, perceptions of particular objects are only relevant to my location, and my location is only relevant to the identity of various objects of perception, on the assumption that these are my perceptions. So it looks as though the value of a Simple Theory of Perception is dependent upon its user's prior identification of herself as 'the subject of this experience'. And as we have seen, such a self-identification is untenable.
But this objection involves a mistaken conception of the complexity of mental selfascription. Normally this is criterionless with respect to its being ascription to oneself.
When I am aware of a pain or a particular perception for example, in the way in which I am normally aware of such things, it is nonsense to suppose that there is a further question about the identity of its owner. Thus a person's being the subject of her perceptions is normally built into her very awareness of them. It is not an additional ingredient, required as a problematic premise for the inferences of her Simple Theory.
Adopting the terminology of Shoemaker and Evans, these basic ways we have of acquiring information about our minds display the phenomenon of 'immunity to error through misidentification' (Shoemaker 1984b; Evans 1982 , § § 6.6 and 7.2). When such self-ascriptions are made on the basis of the special knowledge which a subject has of her own mental states, available in the normal way, and not taken as acquired abnormally, the follow-up question 'But is it I who have the experience / thought / belief etc.?' is absolute nonsense. There is no room for a further question, thus no room for error, about the identity of the subject of these states. For example, the following thoughts just seem absurd, when their subject is reporting the information acquired in the normal way about such things. 'Someone has toothache, but is it I who have toothache?'; 'Someone seems to see King's College Chapel, but is it I who seem to see King's College Chapel?; 'Someone is thinking about chips, but is it I who am thinking about chips?'; and so on.
Evans captures the essence of this phenomenon as follows.
There just does not appear to be a gap between the subject's having information (or appearing to have information), in the appropriate way, that the property of being F is instantiated, and his having information (or appearing to have information) that he is F; for him to have, or appear to have, the information that the property is instantiated just is for it to appear to him that he is F. (1982, pp. 220-1) Indeed any attempt to artificially introduce an articulation into these judgements by basing 'I am F' on 'b is F' and 'I am b', for some putatively more fundamental Idea b of a person, leads into all sorts of regressive epistemological difficulties (Evans 1982, §6.6 ).
So it is quite wrong to think of normal perception self-ascriptions, which clearly display this immunity phenomenon, as identification-dependent with respect to their subject. It is therefore also wrong to insist that any such identification of oneself as 'the subject of this experience' is required as an intermediate premise facilitating the inferences from what is perceived to where one is and from where one is to what is perceived. The central holism of the Simple Theory of Perception both allows for the subject's appreciation of the contingent dependence of her actual course of experience on her location, and finesses the need for her appeal to any mediating descriptive selfidentification, which would undermine this appreciation.
A more incisive objection to the current suggestion, is to question its explanatory value. Intuitively, it is the fact that perception locates its subject as an element of the perceived world which explains the relation between her judgements about what she is perceiving and where she is. And the present appeal to the role of perceptual experience in a Simple Theory of Perception helps to bring out this interdependence; for it suggests that self-locating spatial perception and perception of the world as objective are two interrelated aspects of a single psychological ability. But to explain this unity on the basis of an equivalent one at the higher level of conceptualized judgement seems to get the order of explanation the wrong way round.
In coming to regard the course of her perception as the joint upshot of the way things independently are and her spatio-temporal route through the world, the subject becomes able to operate effortlessly with the holistic pattern of thoughts constituting her Simple Theory of Perception. Thus the nature of her perceptual experience is explanatory of the structure in her thought about the world and her place in it. So it cannot be assumed in giving a theory of perceptual content which is supposed to make the subject's perception of the world as her independent environment intelligible, that the she is already capable of precisely these spatial contents at the level of full-blown conceptualized judgement.
We might put the same point slightly differently as follows. Although the Simple Theory of Perception gives an adequate account of the interconnections in a person's thought between what she is perceiving and where she is, once she has the impression of the perceived world as her environment, it cannot be the key to her grasp of this notion.
We are interested in what it is to perceive the world as constituted by things at places which are in principle accessible to the perceiver, things represented as standing in various spatial relations with her. Our concern is with what constitutes this self-locating spatial structure in perceptual content. So no appeal to a system of judgement which already takes the core of this structure for granted can be satisfactory. Therefore a person's engaging in the little arguments of a Simple Theory of Perception is not sufficient to expel the need for a further psychological embedding of perception which provides the foundations for the appropriate egocentric perceptual and thus judgemental contents.
It is possible in principle, to retain the core of Evans' proposal whilst dispensing with its objectionably conceptualized form. The idea would be to stress the role of perceptual experience in a lower form of spatial reasoning directed at building up and exploiting a cognitive map, which is not necessarily a fully conceptualized structure. One might then claim that it is in virtue of this context that perception attains its self-locating, egocentric spatial content. But as it stands, and suitably distanced form the intellectual sophistication of the suggestion just dismissed, this notion of a form of spatial reasoning directed at building up and exploiting a nonconceptual cognitive map is merely a theoretical placeholder.
One option here, would be to characterize the required reasoning in terms of the perceptual control and coordination of basic spatial action. This is the route I favor and develop in the next section. The alternatives fail to address the phenomenon at issue. We have already admitted the need for further cognitive support if egocentric spatial perception is to make contact with the subject's full-blown concept of herself as a person.
And this might plausibly be regarded as having something to do with cognitive map construction and exploitation. But it is not the primary focus of our question, which concerns primitive perceptual egocentricity. Similarly the intuitive notion of a map is a system of allocentric representations of a kind which raise precisely our opening question how such a thing succeeds in locating the subject in the perceived world without his being one of the explicitly represented items. In the absence of some connection with action, this map suggestion fails to make an impression on self-location. Once the connection is properly made, any additional complexity is unnecessary.
The connection with agency
The fundamental insight at this point is very much Schopenhauer's. It starts with the thought that the only adequate discrimination of the self as an element of the empirical world is anchored in one's interaction with the perceived environment. Perceptual experience alone is powerless to place its subject with respect to its objects. Nor does its role in a Simple Theory of Perception or non-practical cognitive map ultimately help. It is rather that perceptual contents are self-locating in virtue of their contribution to the subject's capacity for basic purposive action in the world. This mutually shaping psychological relation places the subject in the perceived world by bringing its objects into his environment as the focus of his perceptually controlled behavior. At the same time, it maintains a fundamental separation between himself and the rest of the world in virtue of the direct practical awareness he has of the special status of his body as the immediate respondent to his will. It is therefore this role of experience in focussing and guiding world-directed action which justifies the self-locating spatial structure in perceptual contents.
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It is worth filling out the picture a little here, to clarify the way in which the interaction between perceptual experience and basic action is supposed to provide for a subject's selflocation. If perception alone is insufficient, how does acting help? Well the basic idea is that various perceptions are organized and integrated into a representation of the subject's spatial environment in virtue of their role in controlling his behavior with respect to that environment in accordance with his purposes. Egocentric spatial perception enables a subject to keep track of the changing spatial relations between himself and salient environmental objects in precisely the way required appropriately to modulate his spatial behavior with respect to such objects.
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Perceptual experience mediates between a person's 5 A similar suggestion is central to Evans' (1982, ch. 6; and 1985) discussions of the behavioral contribution to the characterization of the origin and axes of egocentric space. See also C. Peacocke (1983, ch. 3; and 1989) for further developments of the same basic idea.
Linda Acredolo (1978) has an experimental paradigm which tests for possession of this tracking ability in a particularly basic case. Having learnt to expect an attractive stimulus to appear at a window on one side of a symmetrical room when a buzzer sounds, the infant subject is rotated 180 degrees about the centre of the room and the buzzer sounds again. Turning towards the wrong window suggests the child has merely learnt a spatial response -'look left!'. But turning to the right window manifests his egocentric identification of a place and his ability to keep track of it during his relative movement over time. He sees the preferences and movements as implicitly governed by a sensitivity both to the continuous dependence of the nature of experience on where the subject is in relation to its objects and to the mechanical properties -dimensions, mass, organization, flexibility, jointing, etc. -of the physical thing which is his body. This anchors and unifies perception as the sensitive director of a single substantial locus of activity in the world. And the unification simultaneously directs the behavior onto the perceived world as purposive and provides a rationale for discriminating representation of the spatial relations between the subject and the things he perceives in his environment, in the nonconceptual content of his perceptual experience. Thus the world is perceived as the subject's environment as he is placed in it as a central, persisting element, moving in it and engaging with its constituents in response to his perceptions. The interrelation between perception and action constitutes a kind of triangulation of the subject's location in the single world of each.
Neither of these capacities alone, that is to say neither perception nor action, suffices to permit the subject to from a representation of his place in the objective world. It is rather that his self-location depends upon the interrelations between his perceptual experience and his purposive interaction with the perceived environment. Given certain primitive preferences, the sensitivity of this fundamental input-output structure both to the geometric dependence of the nature of experience on the subject's changing location in the world and to the basic volumetric and mechanical properties of the body is an essential part of what grounds the sophistication of perceptual contents representing the world as constituted by entities which are spatially located both with respect to each other and to the perceiver.
Thus it is the practical role of perception which ultimately justifies our characterization of stimulus at a particular place, identified by an egocentric frame of reference. He represents its spatial relations with him, placing him with respect to it. It is the natural generalization of this ability that I have in mind as the crucial context for simple, self-locating spatial perception.
it as a representation of things as at places which are in principle accessible to the perceiver. It is, at least in part, the way in which perception is taken up in the guidance and control of the flexible, world-directed behavioral responses of a single, persisting physical entity, which constitutes its egocentric, self-locating spatial content.
Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein
Having made use of Schopenhauerian insights at crucial stages in my argument, it is interesting to compare and contrast his position briefly with my own on these issues. Even in the face of his commitment to a form of transcendental idealism, there is substantial agreement between us on certain key points. And this comparison also gives rise to an interesting diagnosis of Wittgenstein's early views on our place in the world. Indeed I think a good case could be made out for the claim that these views form a significant core of his philosophy, which is highly influential in shaping the later thought through the radical disruption caused by his dismantling of the early logical atomism and picture theory, and his move towards a more explicit focus on linguistic issues.
There are a number of interrelated strands in Schopenhauer's thought about the relation between the self and the world. But the following argument is central. 1 The knowing, representing self can never be an object of any pure representation.
2 Every object in the empirical world is necessarily an object of representation for some subject.
3 Therefore the representing self is not an element of the empirical world.
7
My account of Schopenhauer's views here, and the relation I suggest between them and Wittgenstein's Tractatus, rely heavily on Janaway (1989, esp. chs. 4 and 12; and 1983-4, respectively) . empirical world.
5 Therefore the representing subject and the self as will are distinct.
I have been developing the intuitions behind 1 and 4. At the same time though, we are interested in representation for which 3 is simply false: self-locating perceptual experience places its subject in the perceived world. Hence insofar as Schopenhauer's idealist premise 2 is supposed to engage with what is right about his 1 to yield 3, it must be false. Again, as can be seen from the argument above, when taken in Schopenhauer's way, along with others in which I acknowledge some truth, this idealist premise is supposed to be responsible for 5. But I have been urging that it is only in virtue of the fact that 5 is false that self-locating spatial perception is possible at all. It is precisely because the representing and willing selves are one and the same subject of experience that Schopenhauer's 3 is false, that the subject of perception is given as an element of the perceived objective order.
In fact this thought gives rise to a rather more sophisticated diagnosis of the problem with Schopenhauer's argument. The truth of his first premise is concerned with the level of sense: with the absence of a certain mode of presentation of the self. And the value, if any, in his second premise should surely be sought at the level of reference. Hence the argument is invalid.
As I have been urging, in agreement with both Hume and Kant, there is something right about the idea that neither I nor anyone else is immediately aware of myself qua subject of my perception in experience. And even on the assumption of the only remotely plausible form of idealism, on which every object of the empirical world is potentially given as an object under some mode of presentation to some subject, the move from here to 3 is quite unacceptable. For it is precisely due to my identity as both the perceiving and acting subject that I am an object in the world for myself, and thus that I do satisfy the idealist requirement for empirical existence. I locate myself as an element of the objective order in virtue of the role of perception in controlling my basic action in the perceived world. This psychological relation contributes to my construction of a sense under which I am immediately aware of my physical existence. So the truth of the non-encounterability thesis, which obtains at the level of sense, is quite compatible with both a kind of reference-based idealism and the perceptual location of the subject in the spatial world.
It is clear that Schopenhauer is aware to an extent of the tension in his own account here. Unfortunately though, he is unable to resolve it in the way I suggest. He simply regards it as "the miracle par excellence" that the knowing / representing and willing subjects "flow together into the consciousness of one 'I'" (1966, p. 278) , quite in the face of the fact that his untenable idealism at the level of sense leads him inevitably to the complete distinction between the selves of will and representation.
A similar pattern of difficulties arises for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus discussion of solipsism. As we have already seen, he endorses the modalized Humean thesis of the nonencounterability of the self in perception. But he is unable to share Hume's own sceptical reaction about the existence of anything over and above thoughts and experiences which is the subject of those psychological states and events. For he is also influenced by the Kantian idea that there can be no mentality, no thought or experience, in the absence of a transcendent subject of such thought and experience which is not reducible to any collection of or construction out of the mere bundle of (suitably related) psychological states and events themselves (1929, A 96-130; B 130-169) . Now this pair of claims is quite alright on its own, and entails no particularly problematic conception of the self. But adding a dose of Schopenhauer's extreme sensebased idealism to Hume's non-encounterability and Kant's transcendental unity of apperception, is precisely what issues in Wittgenstein's obscure notion of the self as a "limit of the world" (1961, §5.632) . The self cannot be an object of experience under the mode of presentation 'the subject of this experience' -Hume. Thus the subject of perception is not an item in the world -Schopenhauer. But there must be a subject of thought and experience -Kant. The notion of an entity existing outside the world, which is "all that is the case" (1961, §1), is absurd; therefore the representing, perceiving self is a limit of the world -Wittgenstein.
Here again we see that Schopenhauer's extreme idealism is to blame. Even though the subject of perception is not as such an object of its own experience, for 'the subject of this perception' cannot be a perceptual mode of presentation, there nevertheless is such a thing over and above the mere collection of (its) perceptions. This is an element of the perceived objective order: a person in the physical world. Furthermore, he is placed there for himself in virtue of the mutually structuring interrelation between his perceptual experience and his basic purposive interaction with the environment. It is precisely this joint psychological context of experience successfully guiding movement in the light of preference, in virtue of which perception represents its objects as constituents of its subject's spatial environment, by representing their standing in various spatial relations with him.
Evans
One final comparison is useful for further clarification. In his extremely suggestive discussion of self-identification (1982, ch. 7), Gareth Evans offers a barrage of considerations aimed against a broadly Cartesian conception of the thinking, perceiving self as a non-physical mind, somehow contingently annexed to a particular body in the material world. And he regards the following argument, from the identification-freedom of bodily self-ascription to the physicality of the subject, as "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (p. 220; the argument runs through § § 7.2 and 7.3).
The argument starts with the observation that like normal mental self-ascriptions, certain ways we have of acquiring information about the physical state of our bodies display the phenomenon of 'immunity to error through misidentification'. When various property self-ascriptions are made on the basis of the knowledge which a subject has of his own bodily states, available in the normal way, and not taken as acquired abnormally, the follow-up question 'But is it I who have the property?' is nonsense. Some examples which Evans gives here are the following: 'Someone's legs are crossed, but is it my legs that are crossed?'; 'Someone is hot and sticky, but is it I who am hot and sticky?'; 'Someone is being pushed, but is it I who am being pushed? ' (1982, pp. 220-1) . And as with the psychological case, it is epistemologically problematic to allow for any gap in these bodily self-ascriptions between the subject's awareness that some physical property of being F is instantiated, and her awareness that she is F.
Evans takes this fact that the normal ways we have of acquiring information about our bodily states are immune to error through misidentification with respect to the first person pronoun, as suggestive of the thesis that it is intrinsic to our self-conscious 'I'-thinking itself that we should be disposed to have it controlled by information which might become available in these ways. Hence it is an essential aspect of 'I'-Ideas, in virtue of our possession of which 'I'-thinking is possible at all, that they are sensitive to such information about bodily states. Therefore it must be intrinsic to our self-conscious thought about ourselves that we conceive of ourselves not as contingently embodied minds, the essence of which is pure mental activity, but as individual elements of the objective physical order, with both mental and physical properties. Now this strikes me as a fascinating argument, which surely has some considerable force. My aim is not to assess it though, but rather to point out its connection with my own views. One worry might be that Evans' argument creates an incompatibility with my position, by undermining the connection between perceptual self-location and agency. For it seems to offer an alternative account of the way in which spatial relations between the subject herself and what she perceives enter into the representational content of perception.
The suggestion would be that a person's grasp of the basic causal relations between external objects and her body, which is immediately given as hers in immune bodily selfascription, suffices to unify her space with perceived space. Agency would then emerge as an inessential, special case of such relations. But there are at least the following two difficulties with this proposal. Firstly, our grasp of object-object causation and of participant causation are quite different things. One has to do with the way one reflectively expects the world to behave, from a detached point of view; the other with expectations concerning oneself in relation to the things around one. And the idea that the latter is simply the sum of the former and a special kind of knowledge of one of the objects involved does not seem to capture this difference. In particular, it gets the order of conceptual priority the wrong way round. Coming to think of the causal interactions involving one's body as on a par with those between any pair of objects, animate or inanimate, is a cognitive achievement over and above the more primitive sense of one's ability actively to engage with the perceived environment. Secondly, and relatedly, it also seems to me that the kinds of bodily self-ascriptions which are normally immune to error through misidentification are, at least for us and in the first instance, practical in nature.
That is to say, physical properties of the body are primarily located with respect to active 8 For a lot more on the connection between perceptual egocentricity and participant versus object-object causation, see Campbell 1992. coordinates: the spatial contents of bodily experiences underlying such self-ascriptions are intimately tied up with the subject's thought about action with respect to their locations. So again, there seems to be no avoiding the importance of agency to perceptual self-location.
Indeed, so far from creating an incompatibility, we shall see my argument as the nonconceptual basis for Evans'.
He starts with the capacity for reflective, self-conscious, conceptual thought, and proceeds via the essential relation between the 'I'-Ideas in terms of which this thought takes place and certain privileged ways of acquiring information about the body, to the thesis that such self-conscious 'I'-thinking must be thought about a subject of both mental and physical predicates. Thus he concludes with the idea that the capacity for reflective thought about the self depends on an appreciation of the self as a physical element of the objective order, and so on a Strawsonian conception of the self as a person, a substance to which "both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are equally applicable" (Strawson 1959, p. 104) .
I start with a less sophisticated, nonconceptual, perceptual analogue of his finishing point: the idea of a subject whose perception places him as an individual in the perceived spatial world by representing the things he perceives as standing in various spatial relations with him. This cannot be realized merely by his possession of sensory experience of a particular kind, in the absence of its interaction with any other psychological abilities.
Nor is it ultimately realized in virtue of the role of perception as input into a Simple Theory of Perception or the purely passive construction and exploitation of a cognitive map. Rather, his perceptual experience carries self-locating spatial contents in virtue of its role in controlling and coordinating his purposive interaction with the perceived environment, where two crucial aspects of this role are a reflection of the continuous dependence of the nature of experience on the changing position of the subject with respect to its objects and a sensitivity to the relevant biomechanical properties of the body in the production of appropriate spatial behavior.
So for me, the route is from spatial representation tied to a non-Cartesian conception of the self as a substantial item located in the perceived world, to an essential relation between perceptual experience and world-directed action. This relation is sustained by something like an Evansian immediate sensitivity to relevant bodily information and a reflection of the way in which perceptual experience depends upon the spatial relations between the subject and the things in his environment, which is also central to the role of a Simple Theory of Perception in Evans' account of first person thinking. Whereas Evans is concerned with the crucial part these two components play in the cognitive dynamics of fully conceptual 'I'-thinking though, my concern is to bring out the importance of their governing the mediation of perceptual experience between a person's pro attitudes and his behavior, to the self-locating spatial content of perception. Thus my account provides a nonconceptual foundation for his. It is precisely this structured experiential mediation which justifies our discerning the structure in nonconceptual perceptual contents in virtue of which perception represents things in the external world as spatially located with respect to the perceiving subject.
The account I offer here, is supposed to apply equally to minimally self-conscious beings without a full-blown first person concept. Indeed, if there are non-concept-using perceivers, then to the extent to which their experience is egocentrically perspectival, my account works as well for them.
My thesis then, is that perceptual self-location requires a context of basic spatial action on the perceived world, with which perceptual experience is integrated as the controlling input. It is in virtue of its mediation between preference and performance, as informed by both the dependence of perceptual experience on the location of the subject with respect to the things he perceives and the relevant mechanical properties of his body, that perception represents its objects as standing in various spatial relations with its subject, and thus that it locates him as an item in the perceived world.
